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Nanotechnology is today viewed by many as a great advance in the
quest for stronger and lighter materials, more effective pharmaceuticals,
and better medicine. The critical question-largely unanswered-is
whether this kind of science harbors destructive powers which, if fully
understood, would call for restrictions or a ban on the use of certain types
of nanotechnology.
Current regulations in the United States and Europe cover chemicals
that may be produced in nanoform. However, those regimes are not well
designed to detect the risks posed by nanotechnology because they often
fail to appreciate what is unique about nanomaterials.
It is unlikely that individual countries will act to effectively address
nanotechnology risks because dangers are still uncertain and the potential
costs of regulation are high. Logically, nanotechnology risks should be
addressed at the international level because nanomaterials cross borders
and pose issues worldwide. However, there is little precedent for such
regulation and many obstacles
The best course is to develop the "soft law" predicate for later "hard
law" regulation. Such non-binding international norms or agreements
should include codes of conduct, aspirational guidelines, statements of
best practices, voluntary reporting, risk management systems, and
licensing, accreditation, or certification schemes.
Soft law can be used to create expectations which, once widely
endorsed, can later be translated into binding legal obligations.
Minimizing the health, safety, and environmental risks related to
nanotechnology requires raising the visibility of the issue, collecting
reliable data, establishing prudent practices, building an international
consensus, and eventually enacting and enforcing binding obligations
* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University, San Antonio, Texas. B.A., LL.D., Saint
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that reflect a prudent balance between economic progress and hazard
prevention.
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I. THE CHALLENGES POSED By NEW PRODUCTS
New technologies that are initially seen as great advances in science
and the quest for human progress are sometimes later viewed as
exceedingly dangerous. Thus, we now know that the
chlorofluorocarbons that made refrigeration, air conditioning, and
aerosols possible seriously damage the earth's protective ozone layer;'
1. See Chris Peloso, Crafting an International Climate Change Protocol:
Applying the Lessons Learned from the Success of the Montreal Protocol and the Ozone
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that lead additives can make paint durable but may poison children
generations later;2 that asbestos not only insulates products but destroys
human respiratory systems;3 and that the fossil fuelS4 that catalyze
industry and transportation also speed climate change and its potentially
destructive consequences.' Nanotechnology6 is today viewed by many
as a great advance in the quest for stronger7 and lighter materials,8 more
effective pharmaceuticals,9 better medicine,'o and tinier machines." The
Depletion Problem, 25 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 305, 308 (2010) ("[P]rior to the
Montreal Protocol, CFCs were incorporated into a variety of consumer products."); see
also Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
2. Cf State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 437 (R.I. 2008) ("Children under
six years of age are the most susceptible to lead poisoning.").
3. Cf Timothy B. Mueller, Tomorrow's Causation Standards for Yesterday's
Wonder Material: Reiter v. Acands, Inc. and Maryland's Changing Asbestos Litigation,
25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 437, 440 (2009) ("Asbestos has been used in roughly
four thousand commercial products.").
4. See Andrew Shepherd, The Perilous Hunt for APEC Blue: The Difficulties of
Implementing Effective Environmental Regulations in China, 6 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 595, 600 (2016) (discussing China's emissions).
5. See Veerle Heyvaert, Governing Climate Change: Towards a New Paradigm of
Risk Regulation, 74 MODERN L. REv. 817, 818 (2011) (calling climate change the "most
important environmental risk of our time"); see also U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
6. See Graeme A. Hodge et al., Introduction: The Regulatory Challenges for
Nanotechnologies [hereinafter Introduction], in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
REGULATING NANOTECHNOLOGIES 3, 3 (Graeme A. Hodge et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK] (discussing nanotechnology's "new scientific frontiers").
7. See generally WILLIAM E. PLATTEN III ET AL., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REP.
No. EPA/600/R-14/365, RELEASE OF MICRONIZED COPPER PARTICLES FROM PRESSURE-
TREATED WOOD PRODUCTS (2014).
8. See Robert J. Aitken et al., Regulation of Carbon Nanotubes and Other High
Aspect Ratio Nanoparticles: Approaching this Challenge from the Perspective of
Asbestos, in HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 205, 206 (noting that carbon nanotubes have
"remarkable tensile strength").
9. Cf In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 01-10861, 2015 WL
9412515, at *2 (D. Mass. Dec. 22, 2015) (discussing a "robust nanoparticle formulation"
that "has a tumor-sensitive drug release profile"); In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices
Litig., No. 01-10861, 2014 WL 7330815, at *6 (D. Mass. Dec. 23, 2014) (discussing
targeted nanoparticles that have "the potential to overcome the toxicity and efficacy
limitations associated with traditional cytotoxic agents and molecularly targeted drugs by
releasing drug directly to cancer cells").
10. See Marcus Widmer & Christoph Meili, Approaching the Nanoregulation
Problem in Chemicals Legislation in the EU and US, in HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 238
(progress is "expected" in medical treatments); Rebecca M. Hall, Tong Sun & Mauro
Ferrari, A Portrait of Nanomedicine and Its Bioethical Implications, 40 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 763, 766 (2012) ("[N]anotechnology comprises a set of necessary enablers for
personalized medicine therapeutics to become reality.").
11. See Kenneth Chang & Sewell Chan, 3 Makers of World's Smallest Machines
Awarded Nobel Prize in Chemistry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/
10/06/science/nobel-prize-chemistry.html (discussing the development of
"nanomachines").
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critical question-largely unanswered-is whether this new kind of
science harbors destructive powers which, if fully understood, would call
for restrictions or a ban on the use of nanotechnology, at least in certain
contexts.
This article considers the role that regulation can play in addressing
the health, safety, and environmental risks that may be associated with
nanomaterials. Part II briefly surveys the history and present status of
nanoscience, and the potential associated risks. Part III then considers
why markets and litigation are "imperfect alternatives" 2 that cannot
optimally minimize the risks related to nanotechnology. Part IV
examines the challenges that impede effective regulation of
nanotechnology, and the regulatory steps taken thus far by the European
Union and the United States, two leaders in the scientific development
and commercialization of nanotechnology. Part V then focuses on how
regulation can be made more effective by broadening the domestic array
of regulatory options to go far beyond traditional command-and-control
mechanisms and by internationalizing regulatory efforts through the use
of "soft law"13 instruments. Part VI offers concluding thoughts.
II. THE RISE OF NANOTECHNOLOGY
A. Interdisciplinary Origins
The origins and meanings of nanotechnology are unclear and
disputed. 14 The term "nanotechnology" was probably first used in
1974,15 and it led to a new lexicon in which there are frequent references
to nanomaterials, nanoscale, and nanoparticles, as well as to nanotools,
nanomanufacturing, and nanoapplications.
Nanotechnology is concerned not with one science, but many. It
did not grow from a single discovery, but from contributions in
numerous fields.'6 Nanotechnology crosses a range of disciplines,
including biology, chemistry, physics, engineering, materials science,
medicine, and information technology.'7 These disciplines are united by
the fact that they are concerned with particles at the atomic level,18
12. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 112, 148 (U. Chi. Press 1994).
13. See Joshua A. Lance, Equator Principles III: A Hard Look at Soft Law, 17 N.C.
BANKING INST. 175, 175 (2013) (defining "soft law" as "voluntary, informal guidelines
that carry no legal obligation").
14. Introduction, supra note 6, at 3.
15. Id. at 6.
16. See Chris Tourney, Tracing and Disputing the Story of Nanotechnology, in
HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 46, 46.
17. See Introduction, supra note 6, at 6 (listing fields).
18. Id. at 3 ("atomic").
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specifically the nanoscale, 10-9 units. Thus, a nanometer is 10-9 meters,1 9
which means one-billionth of a meter.20
In nanotechnology, the defining characteristic is exceedingly minute
size.2 1 Research typically involves the manipulation of matter at a scale
of less than 100 nanometers.22
B. Forms and Uses
Nanoparticles take many different forms, including nanospheres,
nanotubes, and nanofibers.23 Nanoparticles are today used in a wide
range of consumer products, such as food and food contact items,
cosmetics and skin care products, coatings such as varnishes and paints,
house cleaning products, environmental remediation chemicals,
communication devices, information technology, biosensors and
biomedical devices, clothing, and textiles.2 4 Silver nanoparticles are
inserted into fabrics to function as antimicrobials, carbon nanotubes are
used to strengthen materials, and titanium dioxide nanoparticles make
sunscreens clear.25
The next generation of nanotechnology will reflect the same
"immense diversity,"26 but will be more complex. It may involve
nanoscale structures that change "in response to exposure to light,
magnetic or electric fields, or the presence of specific types of
molecules."27 Future applications may include targeted drug and gene
delivery mechanisms, diagnostic devices, "smart" clothing and
packaging, optical instruments, cloaking devices, and energy capture and
storage mechanisms.2 8 The range of products is unpredictable.29
Nanotechnology may change the way wars are fought by making
feasible the production of "exceptionally small, uninhabited vehicles or
19. See David Williams, The Scientific Basis for Regulating Nanotechnologies, in
HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 107, 111.
20. See Robert Falkner et al., International Coordination and Cooperation: The
Next Agenda in Nanomaterials Regulation, in HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 508, 508.
21. See Aitken et al., supra note 8, at 205.
22. See Falkner et al., supra note 20, at 508.
23. See Williams, supra note 19, at 108.
24. Id.; Introduction, supra note 6, at 17.
25. See Linda K. Breggin & John Pendergrass, Regulation of Nanoscale Materials
Under Media-specific Environmental Laws, in HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 342, 366.
26. Thomas K. Epprecht, Producing Safety or Managing Risks? How Regulatory
Paradigms Affect Insurability, in HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 163, 168.
27. Breggin & Pendergrass, supra note 25, at 366.
28. Id. at 366; Williams, supra note 19, at 108.
29. Karinne Ludlow & Peter Binks, Regulating Risk: The Bigger Picture, in
HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 144, 154.
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weapons capable of autonomous firing decisions."0  Those same
nanoapplications, in the hands of criminals and terrorists, may also
revolutionize the nature and scope of illegal activity by nonstate actors.3 '
Potential military uses of nanotechnology that stand out as particularly
dangerous include: small sensors, robots, missiles, and satellites; metal-
free firearms; body implants; autonomous combat systems; and devices
32
carrying chemical and biological weapons.
C. Economic Stakes and Obstacles
The economic stakes behind the nanotechnology revolution are
tremendous. "Every major industrial country,"3 3 including the United
States,34 Australia, Japan, and many Member States of the European
Union,35 has invested heavily in the development of nanotechnologies.
Revenue from nano-enabled products grew to more than $1 trillion in
2013.36
The fact that many private interests have made substantial
expenditures on nanotechnology development will undoubtedly make
enactment of restrictive regulations more difficult because those
enterprises are sure to lobby to protect their economic interests.37
Indeed, even though there is substantial room within the WTO
30. Jrgen Altmann, Military Applications: Special Conditions for Regulation, in
HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 372, 372.
31. Susan W. Brenner, Nanocrime?, 1 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 39, 88 (2011)
("Nanotechnology is likely to play a notable role in counterfeiting goods.").
32. See Altmann, supra note 30, at 382 (listing uses); Hitoshi Nasu,
Nanotechnology and the Future of the Law of Weaponry, 91 INT'L L. STUD. 486, 487
(2015) (discussing potential use in hostilities).
33. Kenneth W. Abbott, Douglas J. Sylvester & Gary E. Marchant, Transnational
Regulation ofNanotechnology: Reality or Romanticism, in HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at
525, 525.
34. Nanotechnology Update: Corporations Up Their Spending as Revenues for
Nano-Enabled Products Increase, Lux RESEARCH (Feb. 17, 2014),
https://www.nsf.gov/crssprgm/nano/reports/LUX14-0214_Nanotechnology/o20StudyMar
ketResearch%20Final%2017p.pdf ("The United States maintained its lead over all other
governments, with $2.1 billion of federal and state funding in 2012.").
35. See Breggin & Pendergrass, supra note 25, at 343.
36. See Market Report on Emerging Nanotechnology Now Available, NAT'L SCI.
FOUND. (Feb. 25, 2014), https://www.nsf.gov/news/news summ.jsp?cntn id=130586
("[R]evenue from nano-enabled products grew worldwide from $339 billion in 2010 to
$731 billion in 2012 and to more than $1 trillion in 2013. Revenue from the United
States alone was $110 billion, $236 billion and $318 billion those same years,
respectively.").
37. Cf Altmann, supra note 30, at 373 ("[T]he economic competition between
countries can act as a barrier [to nanotechnology regulation] because better safety
features tend to make production more expensive"); Vincent R. Johnson, Regulating
Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 10 (2006)
("From a business standpoint, hiring a lobbyist is often the smart thing to do.").
476 [Vol. 121:2
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international economic order for states to take action to protect the
environment,38 governments that have invested heavily in promoting
nanotechnologies will be reluctant to adopt measures that might interfere
with the prosperity of the nanotech sector.3 9 Because nanotechnology
developments move at a rapid pace, any regulatory interruption has the
potential to seriously impede innovation and profitability.40
D. Inadequate Information About Risks
The health, safety, and environmental risks associated with
nanotechnology are largely unknown4' because the relevant science is
still evolving. Nanomaterials have been commercially used in products
and services for only a relatively short period of time. There is a "dearth
of information" relating to several key aspects of nanoscale materials.42
The uncertainties relate not merely to health, safety, and
environmental effects, but such basic matters as how to classify
nanomaterials and define nanotechnology.43  The latter is particularly
important because clear and accurate definitions are essential if empirical
studies are to be useful and the ambit of regulatory obligations
intelligently articulated.4 4 The value of early studies of nanotechnology
was compromised by a lack of terminological coordination,4 5 and a
history of inconsistent definitions continues to cause patent-granting
authorities great difficulties in identifying relevant prior art.46
38. See Steve Charnovitz, The WTO's Environmental Progress, 10 J. INT'L EcoN. L.
685, 688-90 (2007) (describing the WTO system).
39. See Andrew D. Maynard, Diana M. Bowman & Graeme A. Hodge,
Conclusions: Triggers, Gaps, Risks and Trust, in HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 573, 579
("Governments have a strong interest in their considerable investments in
nanotechnologies leading to economic stimulation . . .").
40. J. Clarence Davies, From Novel Materials to Next Generation Nanotechnology:
A New Approach to Regulating the Products of Nanotechnology, in HANDBOOK, supra
note 6, at 545, 547.
41. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Nanotechnology and Nanomaterials Research 1,
(last visited June 5, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-
12/documents/nanotechnology-fact-sheet.pdf ("Nanomaterials are very useful, but there
is little research about how they affect human and ecosystem health.").
42. Breggin & Pendergrass, supra note 25, at 355.
43. Id. at 356; John Miles, Nanotechnology Captured, in HANDBOOK, supra note 6,
at 83, 94 (discussing the current "working definition").
44. Williams, supra note 19, at 109-11 ("a great deal will depend on the borderline
between the nanoscale and the microscale").
45. See Oliver Tassinari, Jurron Bradley & Michael Holman, The Evolving
Nanotechnology Environmental, Health, and Safety Landscape: A Business Perspective,
in HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 177, 179.
46. See Gregory N. Mandel, Regulating Nanotechnology Through Intellectual
Property Rights, in HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 388, 393.
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Sound science is the key to charting a safe course through the
potential risks posed by nanotechnology. That precondition depends on
the use of appropriate and widely agreed upon definitions that are able to
draw a reliable boundary "between the products of nanotechnology and
everything else."47
E. The Uncertain Risk Profile
In principle, efforts to minimize health, safety, and environmental
risks should be based on a risk profile for the particular technology that
takes into account the kind of harm to which the risk pertains, the
severity and scale of the risk if it comes to fruition, and the probability of
the risk materializing.48 However, in the case of nanotechnologies, it is
extremely difficult to produce reliable risk assessments because those
judgments turn upon a careful review of exposure- and hazard-related
data, both of which are now surrounded by considerable uncertainties.4 9
There are "huge gaps" in the relevant scientific knowledge.o In
addition, new technological developments more than a few years out are
"inherently unpredictable."1
F. Special Scientific Rules Apply
The seemingly well-established scientific principles that regulate
ordinary life do not apply to nanoparticles. "[N]anotechnologies exploit
the specific properties that arise from matter at the nanoscale that are
characterized by the interplay of classical physics and quantum
mechanics, where the properties are often difficult to predict a priori."52
Nanoparticles may not be "sufficiently alike to afford general
statements about their toxicological properties" in the products and
locations where they may end up.53 Thus, it might never be scientifically
possible to offer assurances that all products containing nanotechnology
are safe. General conclusions about the nanotechnology health-effects
47. Williams, supra note 19, at 122.
48. Roger Brownsword, The Age ofRegulatory Governance and Nanotechnologies,
in HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 60, 70.
49. Introduction, supra note 6, at 3, 13-14.
50. Id. at 16; Quasim Chaudhry, Hans Bouwmeester & Rolf F. Hertel, The Current
Risk Assessment Paradigm in Relation to the Regulation of Nanotechnologies, in
HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 124, 139 (noting "critical knowledge gaps"); Ludlow &
Binks, supra note 29, at 149 (noting "current lack of knowledge").
51. Breggin & Pendergrass, supra note 25, at 366.
52. See Williams, supra note 19, at 108.
53. Alfred Nordmann, Philosophy of Technoscience in the Regime of Vigilance, in
HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 41.
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on large, well-defined classes of things may prove to be beyond the reach
of human knowledge.54
Nanotechnology is described by some as a "wicked" public policy
problem posing challenges so great as to rank with climate change and
synthetic biology.5 A large part of those challenges results from the fact
that nanoscience is interdisciplinary, and consequently there is no "small
body of knowledge" that will yield all the answers about the risks of
nanotechnology.56 Yet regulators need "a profound level of knowledge"
if they are to be able to establish prudent nanotechnology regulations.57
G. Specter ofAsbestos
In many minds, the potential risks of nanotechnology are linked
with the sad history of asbestos. Once viewed as a miracle material,
asbestos was later unmasked as a lethal killer. Some scholars argue that
the risks posed by nanofibers should be evaluated bearing in mind the
carcinogenic effects of asbestos fibers.60
The idea of a possible connection between asbestos and
nanoparticles is reinforced by the fact that for humans, such as workers
in nanotechnology plants,61 inhalation is the most likely route of
exposure to nanoparticles.62 Inhaled nanoparticles that reach the blood
stream may travel to the liver, heart, and blood cells.6 3 It is therefore not
surprising that some scholars argue that it is "imperative" that regulators
54. See id. at 25, 41.
55. See Introduction, supra note 6, at 4.
56. Tourney, supra note 16, at 57.
57. Widmer & Meili, supra note 10, at 241.
58. Introduction, supra note 6, at 7; Aitken et al., supra note 8, at 211-29
(discussing the health risks and eventual regulation of asbestos).
59. Anna Linetskaya, Note, Asbestos Lawsuits in Russia: Bring One If You Can, 22
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 399, 400 (2014) ("Once known as a miracle material used
by emperors and priests to entertain the crowds with its nonflammable qualities, asbestos
is now known as a toxic material that causes cancer.").
60. See Williams, supra note 19, at 119.
61. See Aitken et al., supra note 8, at 208 (indicating there is "almost no
information" on worker exposure); but see Katie Miller, Note, Nanotechnology: How
Voluntary Regulatory Programs Can Both Ease Public Apprehensions and Increase
Innovation in the Midst of Uncertain Federal Regulations, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 435,
444 (2011) ("[Iln August 2009, the deaths of two female factory workers in China were
allegedly linked to adverse effects of nanotechnology at a factory that produced paint
containing nanomaterials. The two girls died from lung damage similar to that seen in
asbestos-related mesothelioma victims . . . . The precise reason for the deaths has not yet
been released, but the possibility that nanoparticles could cause these kinds of effects is
cause for alarm.").
62. Williams, supra note 19, at 119.
63. Id.
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allow wider safety margins for products and applications that are likely
to give rise to significant human exposure to nanoparticles.64
Health risks may be created by free nanoparticles generated during
production processes and negligently released into the environment or
intentionally delivered to persons via nanotechnology-based products.
The exposure of persons to nanoparticles that have characteristics not
previously encountered may overwhelm their immune and inflammatory
defense mechanisms.6 5
Special attention has focused on one particular kind of nanoparticle,
the carbon nanotube. A new form of carbon molecule, carbon nanotubes
are "considered to be many times stronger than steel yet only one sixth
its mass," and to have "unique electronic properties."66 Research has
suggested that some carbon nanotubes may cause serious health
problems because they may exhibit toxic properties similar to asbestos.
However, nanotubes come with a variety of physical and chemical
characteristics,68 and not all are equally hazardous.69 Some scholars say
the risks are "manageable at this time." 70
III. NONREGULATORY ALTERNATIVES
It would be unnecessary to address nanotechnology risks through
regulation if product markets and liability regimes were capable of
ensuring that a proper balance is struck between the competing public
interests in innovation and accident prevention. However, as the
following sections explain, those alternatives fall far short of such a lofty
goal.
A. The Inadequacies of Markets
1. Lack of Information
Consumers are poorly positioned to protect their own interests from
the potential dangers posed by nanotechnology. Much industry-
supported research on nanotechnology is not available to the public,7 '
64. Chaudhry et al., supra note 50, at 140.
65. See Williams, supra note 19, at 116.
66. See Aitken et al., supra note 8, at 205-06.
67. See id. at 206, 229 ("[T]he parallels . .. are remarkable. . .
68. See Tassinari et al., supra note 45, at 194 (discussing carbon nanotubes of
varying lengths and diameters, including multi-walled, single-walled, and double-walled
nanotubes).
69. See Aitken et al., supra note 8, at 231.
70. Tassinari et al., supra note 45, at 195.




and what is available is often shrouded in the complexities of science.
While some products tout that they contain nanoparticles,72 many do
not.73  Even when the presence of nanoparticles is disclosed, as is
required by the European Union Cosmetics Regulation,74 consumers
receive little or no information about the risks of those materials.
Efforts to bring greater transparency to nanotechnology products
have been met with only partial success. Of the 1,814 consumer
products listed on the Nanotechnology Consumer Products Inventory
(2015), 49% of the products (889) do not disclose the composition of the
nanomaterial used in them. Unlike many countries in Europe, the
United States is skeptical about the usefulness of enacting requirements
that mandate the labeling of products containing nanomaterials but do
not notify consumers of specific risks. In the American view, merely
knowing that a product contains nanoparticles is not useful.
Presumably, intelligent consumer decisions about products
produced with nanotechnology would have to be made on an individual
product basis, rather than based on a crude assessment that all
nanoparticles are bad, or that all nanoparticles are good. However,
products containing nanoparticles are becoming widespread, and may
become pervasive. It is unrealistic to expect consumers to engage in a
careful weighing of the risks and alternatives if they purchase
nanotechnology-related goods and services several times a year, or a
week, or a day. There must be a less burdensome, more reliable, means
of guarding against the risks that may be associated with nanoparticles
and nanoapplications.
72. See Md. Ershadul Karim & Abu Bakar Munir, Nanotechnology: Sketching the
Next Big Thing in Malaysian Context, 12 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & Bus. 161, 163 (2015)
(explaining that hundreds of products use the word "nano" in the product name").
73. See Catherine Morris Krow, CNTS, Nano-Tio2, and Nanosilver: Assessing Risk
and Investing in Safety, 11 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & Bus. 146, 154 (2014) (discussing
labeling of products containing nanoscale titanium dioxide in the United States).
74. See Lucas Bergkamp et al., Nanotechnology Regulation in Europe: From
REACH and Nano-Registries to Cosmetics, Biocides, and Medical Devices, 11
NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & Bus. 93, 96 (2014) (Under the Cosmetics Regulation, "the nano-
form must be clearly identified as such in the list of ingredients on the label; any such
nano-form is to be followed by the word 'nano' in brackets.").
75. Marina E. Vance et al., Nanotechnology in the Real World: Redeveloping the
Nanomaterial Consumer Products Inventory, 6 BELLSTEIN J. NANOTECHNOLOGY 1769,
1769 (2015), http://www.beilstein-journals.org/bjnano/single/articleFullText.htm?publicI
d=2190-4286-6-181.
76. Falkner et al., supra note 20, at 519-20.
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2. Lack of Clear Expectations
To be sure, consumers may have preferences for or against
nanotechnology (Americans are generally pro,77 and Europeans con 78).
However, those preferences are shaped more by the media and deeply
engrained cultural values79 than by any careful weighing of the risks and
alternatives. It is "doubtful" whether the media provides consumers with
an objective picture of nanotechnology issues.so
In most situations, consumers have no clear expectations about the
safety or dangerousness of products containing nanoparticles. It was
precisely that type of concern that caused the American Law Institute to
virtually abandon, in the Restatement (Third) of Torts, the "consumer
expectation test" as a standard for determining whether a product is
defective. Consumer expectations are certainly no more reliable in
assessing nanotechnology than in evaluating whether ordinary products,
such as cars,82 are designed in a manner that is unreasonably dangerous.
3. Risks to Workers
Workers who serve in nanotechnology laboratories and related
operations may be even less able than consumers to protect their own
interests due to fear that they will lose their jobs or otherwise be
77. See Ludlow & Binks, supra note 29, at 151 ("at least for the US public, 'a
majority is convinced that the benefits outweigh the risks' in regard to nanotechnology
although they know little about the technology") (footnote omitted) (internal citations
omitted); but see Emilee S. Preble, Note, Preemptive Legislation in the European Union
and the United States on the Topic ofNanomedicine: Examining the Questions Raised by
Smart Medical Technology, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 397, 412 (2010) ("Though
nanotechnology and nanomedicine have many supporters there are other groups in the
United States that are opposed to nanotechnology research and development.").
78. Cf Falkner et al., supra note 20, at 519 (noting that, unlike the US, the EU
regulates nanotechnology related to cosmetics).
79. Cf id at 509 (noting the relevance of "societal risk perceptions").
80. Thorsten Weidl, Gerhard Klein & Rolf Zollner, The Role of Risk Management
Frameworks and Certification Bodies, in HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 462, 475.
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) cmt. g (AM. LAW
INST. 1998). The Restatement retains consumer expectations for some special situations.
For example, "[w]hether ... a fish bone in a commercially distributed fish chowder
constitutes a manufacturing defect ... is best determined by focusing on reasonable
consumer expectations." Id. at cmt. h. In addition, the Restatement holds sellers of used
products strictly liable for manufacturing (and occasionally other) defects in the products
only when the seller's marketing practices would cause reasonable buyers to think that
the product in question is no riskier than if it were new. Id. § 8(b).
82. See Pannu v. Land Rover N. Am., Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 605, 617 n.Il (Ct.
App. 2011) ("Is it within the reasonable consumer's expectation that . .. drastic steering




punished for raising health and safety issues." Workers also often lack
information about the risks to which they are exposed.84 Scholars
contend there is an "urgent need" for monitoring the health of workers
(including academics) who are routinely exposed to nanotubes.
B. The Inadequacies ofLiability Litigation
1. Litigation Follows Innovation
In the United States, innovation is frequently followed by litigation
because new practices often cause personal injuries or property
damage.86 The widespread production of cars, marketing of consumer
goods, and use of computerized data87 all led to lawsuits because they
caused harm, often to innocent persons.8 8 Such tort litigation serves a
useful purpose because it forces enterprises to internalize the costs of
their activities and to make an honest calculation of whether the benefits
of those practices outweigh the risks.89 That type of assessment helps to
produce a reliable determination of whether precautions should be
employed, activity levels reduced, or certain practices ended.90
2. Obstacles to Recovery
However, there are numerous reasons why tort claims related to
nanotechnology may fail. Negligence and strict liability claims related to
products are likely to be defeated by widely recognized "state of the art"
defenses.91 In addition, it is often difficult to prove that a particular
defendant caused a plaintiffs harm, especially where many years have
83. See Brooke E. Lierman, "To Assure Safe and Healthful Working Conditions":
Taking Lessons from Labor Unions to Fulfill OSHA's Promises, 12 Lov. J. PUB. INT. L 1,
15 (2010) (noting "fear of retaliation").
84. Id. at 15 (noting "lack of information about hazards").
85. Aitken et al., supra note 8, at 232.
86. See Vincent R. Johnson, Standardized Tests, Erroneous Scores, and Tort
Liability, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 655, 668 (2007).
87. See Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort
Liability, 57 S.C. L. REv. 255, 256 (2005) ("When an unauthorized user hacks or
otherwise improperly accesses information contained in computerized databases, the
consequences can be devastating for the persons to whom the information relates.").
88. See Johnson, supra note 86, at 669-70 (discussing cars, consumer goods, and
databases). -
89. See Vincent R. Johnson, Credit Monitoring Damages in Cybersecurity Tort
Litigation, 19 GEO. MASON L. REv. 113, 114 (2011) ("By requiring data possessors to
cover credit-monitoring costs, courts will deter breaches of cybersecurity."); id at 151
(discussing deterrence).
90. See id. ("[T]he risk of liability influences both the choice of precautions and
activity levels.").
91. Ludlow & Binks, supra note 29, at 158 (discussing Australia).
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passed, scientific evidence is uncertain, or the plaintiff has been exposed
to other potential causes. In most countries, absent a showing of but-for
causation, a tort claim will not succeed.9 2
In rare cases-such as the DES (diethylstilbestrol) lawsuits in which
daughters were harmed by a drug taken by their pregnant mothers more
than a decade earlier-American courts have shifted the burden of proof
on causation to drug manufacturers and have imposed liability in
proportion to their market share.93 However, only a few jurisdictions
have followed that course.94 Those that have done so have insisted that
the plaintiff sue enough manufacturers so that a substantial share of the
market is represented, prove that all of the manufacturers were negligent,
and demonstrate that the injurious product was produced in a generic
form that makes identification of the responsible manufacturer
impossible.95 The theory of market-share liability is unlikely to aid
nanotechnology plaintiffs for several reasons: namely, lack of fungibility
(since producers may use nanotechnology in different ways) and lack of
negligence. It would presumably not be feasible to prove that
nanotechnology manufacturers were negligent if the risk that they failed
to avoid was unforeseeable.96 Moreover, if those manufacturers
conformed to the customs in the industry, and those customs were
reasonable, those practices would likely be treated as evidence that the
manufacturers did not act negligently.97 Manufacturers may also be able
to successfully invoke "the bulk supplier defense, the learned
intermediary defense, and the sophisticated user doctrine."98
Nanotechnology tort claims may fail for reasons related to statutes
of limitations,99 forum non conveniens,100 comparative fault,101 or bias on
92. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26
(AM. LAW INST. 2010) ("Tortious conduct must be a factual cause of harm for liability to
be imposed. Conduct is a factual cause of harm when the harm would not have occurred
absent the conduct.").
93. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 938 (Cal. 1980) (adopting
market-share liability).
94. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 28 cmt. p (AM. LAW INST. 2010) ("[T]he number of jurisdictions that have
addressed and resolved ... [the question of market-share liability] for DES victims is
quite small.").
95. See id. ("Virtually all courts that have considered the question have declined to
apply a market-share liability theory to products that are not fungible.").
96. See id. § 3 ("To establish the actor's negligence, it is not enough that there be a
likelihood of harm; the likelihood must be foreseeable to the actor at the time of
conduct.").
97. See generally id. § 13 (discussing custom).
98. Potential Theories ofLiability, 3 Toxic TORTS LITIGATION GUIDE § 36:14 (2015
supp.).
99. See Statute of Limitations, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defined
as "[a] law that bars claims after a specified period").
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the part of judges, juries, or arbitrators.102 Moreover, even potentially
successful claims would be worthless if the responsible defendant is no
longer in business or lacks assets capable of paying a judgment.
Whereas litigation has been successful in generating a "broad-based
regulatory change addressing climate change,"'03 environmental lawsuits
seeking compensation for cross-border harm have been much less
effective. 104 Thus, even if nanotechnology causes transboundary harm, a
plaintiff might fail to recover due to lack of jurisdiction over the
defendant, or inability to enforce a judgment. There have been many
obstacles in past cases involving science less complex than
nanotechnology, and "there is still a pressing need to strengthen tort
remedies for transboundary environmental damage."0
5
3. Possible Reforms
It would be possible to improve the chances that a person injured by
nanotechnology could recover compensation in tort actions. Claims
might be tried before specialized tribunals with environmental
expertise,10 6 by international tribunals insulated from the pressures of
100. See Forum Non Conveniens, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(defined as "the doctrine that an appropriate forum-even though competent under the
law-may divest itself of jurisdiction if, for the convenience of the litigants and the
witnesses, it appears that the action should proceed in another forum in which the action
might also have been properly brought in the first place"). See generally Chenglin Liu,
Escaping Liability Via Forum Non Conveniens: Conocophillips's Oil Spill in China, 17
U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 137 (2014) (discussing application of the doctrine).
101. See UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1(a), 12 U.L.A. 135-40 (1996)
(discussing pure comparative fault).
102. Cf Shi-Ling Hsu, The Identifiability Bias in Environmental Law, 35 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 433, 504 (2008) ("We ... do not have sufficient safeguards built in to protect
those that most need protecting, those that we cannot identify.").
103. Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation's Regulatory
Pathways: A Comparative Analysis of the United States and Australia, 35 L. & POL'Y
150, 175 (2013).
104. See Noah Sachs, Beyond the Liability Wall: Strengthening Tort Remedies in
International Environmental Law, 55 UCLA L. REv. 837, 838 (2008) ("States have been
unwilling to accept treaty language that would impose liability for transboundary
pollution on states directly (so-called state liability). In the realm of private international
law, . . . states have also rejected most civil liability treaties establishing the tort liability
of private actors for transboundary pollution.").
105. Id. at 890.
106. See J. Michael Angstadt, Securing Access to Justice Through Environmental
Courts and Tribunals: A Case in Diversity, 17 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 345, 347 (2016)
(Environmental courts and tribunals "provide a potential mechanism for translating
international environmental norms into discrete policy questions at the national or
substate level"); Hon. Michael D. Wilson, The Hawaii Environmental Court: A New
Judicial Tool to Enforce Hawaii's Environmental Laws, HAw. B.J., Aug. 2015, at 4
(discussing a court established to "promote and protect Hawaii's natural environment")
(internal citations omitted).
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domestic politics,tor or via enhanced aggregate litigation procedures.0
Incentives related to attorney's fees,109 or punitive or multiple
damages,1 10 might make it easier for plaintiffs to find representation.
Medical monitoring damages"1 might be awarded in cases where
the plaintiff has been seriously exposed to toxic nanoparticles. Even if
there is no proof that the exposure has already caused harm, monitoring
the possible emergence of a diseased condition and the need for
treatment is reasonable and prudent.1 12
In products liability litigation, California shifts to a defendant the
burden of proving that a product was not defective if the plaintiff
introduces evidence that the product's design contributed to the
plaintiffs injury. 13  So too, new rules might shift to nanotechnology
defendants the burden of proving that nanoparticles did not cause the
plaintiffs harm, if the plaintiff shows that the product contained
nanotechnology and there is credible scientific evidence that such
nanotechnology might be injurious.
However, even this "wish list" of reforms would only increase the
chances that nanotechnology defendants would be held liable for harm
caused by their products. It would not insure that all costs associated
with nanotechnology activities are internalized by potential defendants or
that optimal precautions are taken to avoid unnecessary harm. Moreover,
because some diseases develop slowly, many judgments might occur so
long after the tortious conduct in question as to have little deterrent effect
on the conduct of the defendants and others.
107. See Alessandra Lehmen, The Case for the Creation of an International
Environmental Court: Non-State Actors and International Environmental Dispute
Resolution, 26 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 180 (2015)
(discussing "the main characteristics around which such a court would be organized").
108. See, e.g., Vincent R. Johnson, The Rule of Law and Enforcement of Chinese
Tort Law, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 43, 87 (2011) ("[In China], there are no provisions for
aggregate litigation (e.g., class actions).").
109. See VINCENT R. JOHNSON, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAw 23 (5th ed. 2013)
(Noting that under the "American rule" a plaintiff who prevails does not recover
attorney's fees).
110. See Vincent R. Johnson, Punitive Damages, Chinese Tort Lay, and the
American Experience, 9 FRONTIERS L. CHINA 321, 326 (2014) (explaining that despite the
Chinese Tort Laws' authorization of punitive damages in products liability actions,
"punitive damages have never been awarded by a Chinese court").
111. See Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 714 (Mo. 2007)
(allowing recovery of medical monitoring damages without proof of a pre-existing
injury).
112. Cf Johnson, supra note 89, at 132-39 (analogizing credit monitoring damages
in data breach cases to medical monitoring damages in toxic exposure cases).




There is no assurance that court decisions will identify and address
nanotechnology risks in a systematic and timely manner.
Nanotechnology has existed in the United States for decades. However,
there is still not one reported American case in which tort damages have
been awarded to a person injured by nanoparticle.114 This experience is
consistent with the track record in other countries.11s
IV. REGULATORY OBSTACLES AND REGIMES
Regulation offers the possibility of remedying many of the
deficiencies of markets and litigation. If properly employed, regulation
can reduce nanotechnology risks. When risks are lower, there is less
need for individuals to grapple with the challenges of obtaining and
114. The author conducted a search of the Cases database in Westlaw on May 30,
2016. Of the fifty cases found by searching for the term "nanoparticle," the great
majority were patent infringement actions. None of the tort claims seeking personal
injury damages contained a substantial discussion of risks related to nanotechnology. But
see Rowan v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-272V, 2014 WL 7465661, at *12
(Fed. Cl. Dec. 8, 2014) (brief mention in unsuccessful action under the National Vaccine
Injury Compensation Act; "Dr. Shoenfeld testified that ... '. .. nanoparticles of the
aluminum are diffused to the brain to induce ... [headaches,' but] does not provide any
facts from the petitioner's medical records or any other evidentiary foundation to support
his conclusion that petitioner's headaches were caused by nanoparticles of aluminum in
her brain."); D'Angiolini v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-578V, 2014 WL
1678145, at *6 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 27, 2014) (brief mention in a case where the plaintiff
unsuccessfully sought damages under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act; "For
the medical theory causally connecting the hepatitis B vaccination to any injury . .. Mr.
D'Angiolini asserted: '[the] hepatitis B vaccine's adjuvant ... diffuses into the brain as
nanoparticles . .. causes damage to the brain cells, which leads to cognitive impairment,
memory loss and other neurological manifestations."'); In re Wright Med. Tech. Inc.,
Conserve Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 127 F. Supp. 3d 1306, 1326-27 (N.D. Ga.
2015) (brief mention in products liability case raising issues related to motions relating to
expert testimony and summary judgment; "Laposata concluded that the 'Conserve metal-
on-metal hip orthopedic implant generates nanoparticles of cobalt/chromium and
chromium phosphate aggregates.' . . . Laposata explains the unique reactions that occur
in the body when nanoparticles of cobalt-chromium are shed from metal-on-metal hip
replacements."); In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Pinnacle Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 3:11-MD-2244-K, 2014 WL 3557345, at *14 (N.D. Tex. July 18, 2014) (refusing to
exclude expert testimony about nanoparticles in hip replacements products liability
litigation).
115. See Hall et al., supra note 10, at 776 ("[N]o death or major injury has been
attributed to nanotechnology to date [2012]."); Widmer & Meili, supra note 10, at 239
(stating in 2010 that "there are no known cases of death that can be conclusively be
attributed to nanotechnologies or the use of manufactured nanomaterials"); see also
Tracy D. Hester, Quiet So Far: A Muted Response to Allegations of the First Human
Fatalities Linked to Nanoparticles, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10007, 10007
n.3 (2010) ("Although the German government issued a recall of MagicNano (a
household sealing material) . . . because the product injured over 110 consumers who
used it, subsequent reports confirmed that MagicNano did not actually contain any
nanoparticles . . . .").
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evaluating information about nanotechnology-related products or to sue
to recover damages for the harm that they cause.
A. Balancing Growth and Precautions
In basic terms, risk regulation is "the exercise of public authority
(however broadly construed) with intent to affect the likelihood and/or
magnitude of socially undesirable events."'16  Whether regulation is
effective is a function of not only whether the regulatory purposes and
means are legitimate, but whether, in situations involving technology, the
regulatory efforts are properly linked to their target.117
Regulators seeking to manage the largely unidentified health,
safety, and environmental risks that may be posed by emerging
nanotechnologies face an unenviable task. They must strike a prudent
balance between maximizing sustainable economic growth and devoting
sufficient resources to precautions.118 Because "risks never affect all
segments of the population" alike, the "process of risk identification is
therefore simultaneously one of selection, involving controversial
normative judgment."119 Addressing the risks presented by nanoscale
materials is especially difficult because in many cases those risks are
"too small to be detected by current technology."1 20
B. Systemic Challenges to Effective Regulation
There are systemic obstacles to effective regulation of health,
safety, and environmental risks at the national level.12 1 These obstacles
are likely to be just as great with respect to nanotechnology as in other
areas of regulation.
First, regulatory agencies are often underfundedl2 2 and lack the
resources that are needed to adequately address complex scientific
116. Heyvaert, supra note 5, at 819; see also Julia Black, What is Regulatory
Innovation?, in REGULATORY INNOVATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 11 (Julia Black,
Martin Lodge & Mark Thatcher eds., 2005) (defining regulation as "the sustained and
focused attempt" to guide the behavior of others).
117. Brownsword, supra note 48, at 66.
118. Introduction, supra note 6, at 3.
119. Heyvaert, supra note 5, at 822.
120. Breggin & Pendergrass, supra note 25, at 359.
121. See Vincent R. Johnson, Liberating Progress and the Free Market from the
Specter of Tort Liability, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 1026, 1048-53 (1989) (book review)
(discussing budgetary limitations, pressures from special interests, and political
pressures).
122. See, e.g., Caitlin Troyer Busch, Ethical Convergence and the Endangered




issues.123 This is true in part because both governments and their critics
often seek to minimize regulatory burdens.124  That often means
insufficient funds are appropriated for regulatory use.
Second, in many countries, political appointees play an important
role in heading regulatory agencies.125 Consequently, there is a risk that
regulatory decisions will reflect political priorities rather than an even-
handed assessment of scientific and economic information about risks
and the costs of restrictions. 126 This is especially true when politicians
seek to win the approval of businesses or the public by waging a "war on
science," as has recently been true in the United States.12 7
Third, regulatory agencies are subject to administrative capture1 28 if
personnel are recruited from, and move to, the business entities that are
regulated. A "revolving door" between public service and the private
sector threatens to make regulatory agencies less independent. Official
convergence-and-endangered-species-act ("[T]he Fish and Wildlife Service ... has been
called 'one of the most severely underfunded natural resource agencies."').
123. See Heyvaert, supra note 5, at 825 (referring to the European Union as a "cash-
strapped" regulator).
124. See Introduction, supra note 6, at 13 (indicating that some governments
"actively seek" to reduce regulatory burdens); GOP Can Cut Some Regulations Quickly,
DES MOINES REG., Nov. 16, 2016, at B3, 2016 WLNR 35133819 ("Congressional
Republicans are poised to act quickly . .. to repeal tens of billions of dollars in
environmental regulations and other federal rules").
125. Cf Loretta Tuell, The Obama Administration and Indian Law-A Pledge to
Build A True Nation-to-Nation Relationship, FED. LAW., Apr. 2016, at 44, 45 ("As
political appointees typically share the ideology of the president who appoints them, their
role is to essentially extend the president's influence governmentwide.").
126. See ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY,
STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 99 (2d ed. 2011) (quoting Stephen Breyer as stating that a
"depoliticized regulatory process might produce better results").
127. See Joel Achenbach, Why Do Many Reasonable People Doubt Science?, NAT'L
GEO. (Mar. 2015), http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2015/03/science-doubters/achen
bach-text ("We live in an age when all manner of scientific knowledge-from the safety
of fluoride and vaccines to the reality of climate change-faces organized and often
furious opposition.").
128. Johnson, supra note 37, at 35 ("Administrative capture" occurs when "an
administrative agency is dominated by those it is supposed to regulate and becomes less
effective as a result."). See also Timothy J. Van Hal, Taming the Golden Goose: Private
Companies, Consumer Geolocation Data, and the Need for a Class Action Regime for
Privacy Protection, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 713, 743 (2013) ("[A]dministrative
capture ... refers to interest groups or market actors exerting a 'capturing' influence on
the staff or commission members of a regulatory agency, typically leading to the
implementation of the preferred policy outcomes of special interest groups."); Ian Ayres
& F. Clayton Miller, "I'll Sell It to You at Cost": Legal Methods to Promote Retail
Markup Disclosure, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 1047, 1070, 1070 n.87 (1990) ("Regulated
agencies .. . can be 'captured' by the very firms they are mandated to regulate. Captured
agencies have been the source of many inefficient regulations.").
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decision-making may reflect the loyalty of agency employees to their
former or potential future employers.12 9
Fourth, regulatory agencies tend toward "inertia."130 They naturally
resist change, and tend to apply yesterday's solutions to tomorrow's
challenges.131 This is particularly dangerous when the new risks that
must be addressed are qualitatively different from earlier problems.
C. Nanospecific Regulation Versus General Regulation
There is a fundamental question as to whether the risks related to
nanotechnology should be regulated under nanospecific regimes or
general regulatory regimes. It can be argued that general regulatory
requirements applicable to existing products should be applied to new
products containing both nanomaterials and conventional materials.
Doing so is a logical starting point for regulation,13 2 for "[i]t is not clear
that nanotechnology products as a class are inherently more dangerous
than non-nanotechnology products."33
This is the approach that has been taken by most countries that have
addressed issues related to nanotechnology.134  The regulation of
nanotechnology has "generally been framed by governments as the
continuation of scientific developments," and as merely calling for the
application or possible revision of existing regulatory schemes to meet
the potential risks posed by nanoapplications.135
However, such a general regulatory focus may fail to appreciate
what is unique about nanomaterials. Nanoparticles can pass through
membranes36 and enter the body "through unexpected paths." 37
Nanomaterials may also pose special risks because of their tube-like or
129. See Paul Rose & Christopher J. Walker, Dodd-Frank Regulators, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, and Agency Capture, 66 STAN. L. REv. ONLINE 9, 14 (2013) ("[A]gency capture
can occur for many reasons, including the revolving-door phenomenon whereby
regulators anticipate taking or returning to jobs in industry and fear alienating the entities
they regulate.").
130. Maynard et al., supra note 39, at 577.
131. Id at 577 ("Bureaucracy . .. encourage[s] the shoehorning of new challenges
into old regulatory frameworks.").
132. Introduction, supra note 6, at 11.
133. Cf Abbott et al., supra note 33, at 526.
134. See Falkner et al., supra note 20, at 511 ("[G]overnments in leading
industrialized countries ... [began] by relying on existing frameworks for EHS
[environment, health, and safety] regulation to deal with nanotechnology risks, making
minor adjustments .... ).
135. Ludlow & Binks, supra note 29, at 146.
136. Williams, supra note 19, at 119.
137. Widmer & Meili, supra note 10, at 238.
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wafer shape,138 which results in increased surface area in comparison to
mass or weight.139  "[O]ne of the characteristics that confers special
properties to products of nanotechnologies is the large surface-area-to-
volume ratio that is encountered at very small dimensions."14 0 That is
why nanoparticles are generally more toxic than larger particles when
compared on a mass-dose basis.141
Despite the fact that "[t]here does not appear to be any sharp change
in either toxicokinetic or toxicodynamic properties of substances at any
particular size,"l42 European Union scientists now recognize that "the
adverse effects of nanoparticles cannot be predicted (or derived) from the
known toxicity of material of macroscopic size, which obey the laws of
classical physics."l43 Indeed, nanoparticles sometimes display radically
different physical or chemical properties than their bulk counterparts.
Some materials that are inert in their larger form are reactive when
produced at the nanoscale, and may exhibit special optical, electrical, and
magnetic behavior.144
In recent years, a number of key regulatory bodies have moved in
the direction of nanospecific regulations.14 5 However, in the casualty
insurance business, where nanotechnology is one of "the top four
emerging risks,"1 46 policies continue to cover products and services
involving nanotechnology,147 "without seeing any good reason for
nanotechnology-specific changes to liability." 48  Of course, the
judgments of insurers are no substitute for informed decisions by
regulators. Insurance companies merely evaluate the financial exposure
within which they will provide coverage; regulators have an obligation to
protect society from serious avoidable hazards.149 Providing insurance is
merely a decision that "accepting a risk is an attractive proposition."50
138. Introduction, supra note 6, at 15 ("A further problem is that a conventional
application of the risk assessment paradigm that relies on mass concentration as an
exposure metric may not be appropriate .... ).
139. Breggin & Pendergrass, supra note 25, at 359 ("[P]article count or surface are
rather than mass may be more appropriate for measuring the health or environmental
effects of nanoscale particles.")
140. Williams, supra note 19, at 112.
141. See id. at 120.
142. Id. at 110-11.
143. Id. at 108.
144. See Miles, supra note 43, at 94-95.
145. See Tassinari et al., supra note 45, at 178.
146. Widmer & Meili, supra note 10, at 239.
147. See Epprecht, supra note 26, at 168 (discussing the existing casualty business).
148. Id. at 172.
149. See id at 169.
150. Id. at 169.
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D. The Precautionary Principle
Aside from the question of whether regulations should be
nanospecific or general, there is a second fundamental choice that greatly
influences regulatory design and decision-making. That matter is the
priority and weight to be accorded to the "precautionary principle."15 1
Virtually everyone agrees that cost-effective measures should be
taken to avoid serious risks of unnecessary harm. The question is how to
deal with situations where the cost-effectiveness of precautions, or
seriousness of risks, is less than clear. The precautionary principle is
frequently invoked in efforts to resolve such uncertainties,15 2 but how it
is articulated often determines the answer it provides. The precautionary
principle can be stated in terms that are risk-averse5 3 or risk-tolerant,
stringent or lenient, strong or weak. What the principle means depends
on how it is phrased.
The precautionary principle can be read to mean that "in those cases
in which there is a suspected, but not proven, risk of harm to the public
or the environment, the burden of proof is on the producer of the risk to
prove the lack of harmfulness."l54 Such a reading is stronger and more
risk-averse than if the principle is construed as meaning that "it may be
warranted to undertake regulatory action to protect health or the
environment in the absence of conclusive evidence of harm."155  Not
surprisingly, some scholars argue that the precautionary principle must
be given a compelling gloss if a particular innovation threatens to cause
potentially irreversible changes or to eradicate mankind.156
Because the meaning of the precautionary principle is widely
debated, it offers few clear answers to questions about how a regulatory
system should be structured or administered. As a result, its importance
as a policy principle may be "overplayed."1 57 Indeed, despite bearing a
moniker that sounds noble and wise, the precautionary principle may
151. See generally Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, The Precautionary Principle
as a Basis for Decision Making, 2 EcoNoMISTs' VOICE 1 (2005).
152. See, e.g., Widmer & Meili, supra note 10, at 243 (indicating that in Europe
"[t]he provisions of REACH explicitly declare that the precautionary principle should be
applied when administering the Regulation").
153. See, e.g., id. at 243-44 (stating that in accordance with the precautionary
principle, "safety assessment should normally be based on the evidence that gives rise to
highest concern (worst-case scenario)").
154. BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 126, at 94.
155. Veerle Heyvaert, Facing the Consequences of the Precautionary Principle in
European Community Law, 31 EUR. L. REv. 185, 185 (2006).
156. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2004)
(discussing scientific accidents and events in which even unlikely hypothetical scenarios
are not negligible when the outcome would be disastrous).
157. See Heyvaert, supra note 155, at 188.
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facilitate protectionismiss or impede the development of new scientific
breakthroughs that would enable society to cope with the risks of new
technology.15 9
Anyone venturing into the thickets of environmental regulation
must be prepared to confront many arguments cloaked in the mantle of
the very uncertain 16 precautionary principle.16 1  "[G]overnments
increasingly use the precautionary principle when a new technology is to
be licensed."1 6 2 The European Union has been a leader in promoting that
view.163 However, when a regulatory body invokes the precautionary
principle, the most relevant inquiry may be to ask why the body is
qualified and authorized to make precautionary decisions.
Cass Sunstein argues that strong versions of the precautionary
principle are logically inconsistent and frequently paralyzing, cause
serious harm by increasing the use of inferior technologies, and offer no
"guidance on how much to regulate."16 4 The precautionary principle is
no substitute for making the best possible effort to balance the relevant
costs and benefits.165
E. European Union
In the European Union, rigorous procedures are in place to balance
the public interest in new technologies against competing interests in
public health.166  The Directorate General for Health and Consumer
Affairs may seek guidance from the Scientific Committee for Emerging
and Newly Identified Health Risks.16 7 That committee has considered
the risks posed by nanotechnologies on several occasions.16 8
The REACH Regulation deals with Registration, Evaluation, and
Authorization of Chemicals.169 One of the most important instruments
ever adopted by the European Union, REACH became effective in 2007.
158. See id. at 187 (discussing Majone).
159. See id. at 187-88 (discussing United States commentators).
160. See id. at 189 ("[T]he precautionary principle has been the subject of so many
different characterisations and value judgments.").
161. See, e.g., Aitken et al., supra note 8, at 231 ("It is clear that we cannot afford,
ethically and financially, to await the human consequences of nanotube exposure before
considering the implication of adequate regulations of exposure, use and disposal of
nanotubes.").
162. Altmann, supra note 30, at 373.
163. See Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 151, at 1.
164. See id. at 2-6.
165. See id at 6.
166. See Williams, supra note 19, at 107 (describing the European Union regime); id.
at 119 ("[T]here is an urgent need for toxicokinetic data for nanoparticles.").
167. See id. at 107.
168. See id
169. Commission Regulation 1907/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 396) 1 (EC).
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The regulation seeks to ensure both environmental protection and free
movement of goods within the European Union.170 REACH imposes
binding obligations on all Member States,171 and thus limits the
regulatory options of more environmentally friendly Member States.172
Though REACH is the "regulatory framework of greatest relevance
to the governance of nanomaterials on the EU level,"l 73 it is not a
nanospecific regime. Instead, REACH covers all chemicals,174 including
chemicals in their nanoform. There are no specific provisions related to
the size of a material,17 and thus, "REACH considers nanoparticles in
the same category as their bulk form." 7 6 However, nanomaterials do not
need to be registered until they "pass a threshold of one metric ton or
more of annual output or imports." 77 Higher volumes passing a ten ton
per year threshold must submit a chemical safety report containing a
chemical risk assessment.178 Above one hundred tons per year, detailed
toxicity testing is required.179
To obtain authorization for the marketing or use of dangerous
chemicals, toxicological data must be disclosed.'8 A company must
show that the chemical's risks are adequately contained or outweighed
by the socio-economic benefits of use.8' However, in carrying this
170. See Commission Regulation 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 16 December 2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances
and mixtures, amending and repealing Council Directives 67/548 and 1999/45 and
amending Commission Regulation 1907/2006, 2008 O.J. (353) 1 (affirming the dual
objectives of a "a high level of protection of health and the environment" and "the free
movement of substances"); Widmer & Meili, supra note 10, at 245 (the REACH
Regulation is based on a principle of "'no data, no market' . . . meaning that market
introduction can only occur after registration is complete").
171. See Tassinari et al., supra note 45, at 189.
172. See Jean-Philippe Montfort, Giovanni Indirli, Daniela Georgieva & Claire-
Marie Carrega, Nanomaterials Under REACH: Legal Aspects Unless and Until REACH
is Adapted to More Specifically Regulate Nanomaterials, Is There Scope for National
Measures to Regulate These Materials?, 1 EUR. J. RISK REG. 51, 62 (2010) (arguing that,
under REACH, "national measures which require the reporting or labelling of
nanomaterials cannot be justified").
173. Lawrence G. Cetrulo, International Regulation-European Union, in 3 Toxic
TORTS LITIGATION GuIDE § 36:13 (Supp. 2015).
174. See Widmer & Meili, supra note 10, at 244.
175. See Montfort et al., supra note 172, at 52 (2010).
176. Tassinari et al., supra note 45, at 189.
177. Id.
178. See Widmer & Meili, supra note 10, at 244.
179. See id
180. Cetrulo, supra note 173.
181. Widmer & Meili, supra note 10, at 244 ("REACH allocates the responsibility to
prove that no unreasonable risks will result from the use of a chemical to those who
advocate for its use.").
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burdenl82 the company enjoys the benefit of the chemical's prior
inclusion on the SVHC candidate list.18 3
The obligations imposed by REACH are complemented by
harmonized classification, packaging, and labeling requirements. In
November 2008, the European Chemical Agency promulgated a
regulation "requiring cosmetics containing nanoscale ingredients to
disclose that information on their labels." 84
Questions can be raised about the wisdom of the European Union
regulatory design.18' Self-reporting by companies generates a massive
amount of information of inconsistent quality and dubious usefulness.
The quantity of data is far beyond the verification capacity of regulators.
As the Volkswagen emissions scandall86 has demonstrated, self-reporting
is often misleading or outright fraudulent.18 7 In addition, the reporting
thresholds allow chemicals produced in smaller amounts to "slip through
the net of chemical regulations."8 Moreover, because all relevant
information relating to a chemical is reported together, regulators
focusing on nanomaterial risks must "make 'informed guesses' on
whether a given chemical is used in nanoform or not."1 89
REACH imposes post-regulation obligations requiring registrants to
update information in relation to changes in the quantities of chemicals
manufactured or imported, new uses, or new knowledge about risks to
human health or the environment.190 However, REACH's approach to
nanotechnology risk regulation may be fundamentally flawed because it
is artificially segmented. It zeros "in on the risk particularities of
singular chemicals, but [is] not equipped to generate or even fully
182. See id. (describing the responsibility as a "shift" in the burden of proof').
183. But see Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies: Opportunities and Uncertainties
71, ROYAL Soc'Y AND ROYAL ACAD. OF ENG'G (July 2004), https://royalsociety.org
/-/media/Royal Society Content/policy/publications/2004/9693.pdf (recommending that
nanoparticles or nanotubes be treated as new substances).
184. Cetrulo, supra note 173.
185. See Williams, supra note 19, at 108.
186. See Peter Whoriskey et al., 11 Million Volkswagens Have Cheating Software,
WASH. PosT, Sept. 23, 2015, at A01; Vincent R. Johnson, Op-Ed: What Did VW's
Lawyers Know? The Answer Could Be Career-Ending, NAT'L L.J. (Nov. 2, 2015),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=12027
4 1218717/OpEd-What-Did-VWs-Lawyers-
Know-The-Answer-Could-Be-CareerEnding (discussing the ethical obligations of the
lawyers who represented Volkswagen).
187. Jack Ewing, Volkswagen Deal on Emission Cheating in U.S. Is Expected, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 21, 2016, at B2 ("In Germany, Volkswagen shareholders have sued the
company claiming that top executives violated their duty to report information that could
affect the share price.").
188. Widmer & Meili, supra note 10, at 263.
189. Id.at261.
190. Id. at 261.
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integrate information on synergistic effects caused by exposure to
chemical compounds."191
The European Union has adopted nanospecific regulations related to
cosmetics and biocides. The Cosmetics Regulation mandates that the
toxicological risk of all substances contained in cosmetics be evaluated
with particular attention to nanomaterials.192 A report must be made by
the manufacturer before the product is placed on the market identifying
the nanomaterial at issue, its size and physical and chemical properties,
and relevant toxicological and safety data.193 The Commission may ban
or restrict the use of dangerous substances in cosmetics.194  The
"Biocides Regulation follows the same pattern as the Cosmetics
Regulation."l9 5
F. United States
The United States regulates nanotechnology primarily through the
Toxic Substances Control Act. 196 Under the Act, which is general rather
than nanospecific, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has
authority to control and restrict harmful substances, and to require
manufacturers to submit relevant data on health, safety, and
environmental impacts.19 7  The EPA may require pre-manufacturing
notifications of new chemicals, which are then ordinarily subject to
special reporting requirements.19 8
The EPA may regulate a chemical substance if it demonstrates that
there is a reasonable basis for concluding that the chemical "presents, or
will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or environment."199
The regulation must be based on conclusive data about the particular
chemical, must take into consideration relevant risks, costs, and benefits,
and must be the least burdensome alternative.200
These requirements-which are an implicit rejection of the
precautionary principle2 0' and a deliberate allocation of the burden of
191. Heyvaert, supra note 5, at 825.
192. See Bergkamp, supra note 74, at 95.
193. See id. at 96.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 97.
196. Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2697 (2012).
197. Widmer & Meili, supra note 10, at 247.
198. Id. at 247-48 (citing Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, § 6, 90
Stat. 2003, 2017 (1976) (amended 2016)).
199. Id. at 250 (citing Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, § 6, 90
Stat. 2003, 2017 (1976) (amended 2016)).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 256.
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proof to the regulator, rather than manufacturers202-create substantial
obstacles to the imposition of regulatory restrictions for purposes of
mitigating nanotechnology risks.203 However, since 2008, the EPA has
held that carbon nanotubes are different from graphite and other forms of
carbon.204 The EPA now requires separate registration and inspection of
carbon nanotubes.20 5 In 2012, the EPA promulgated rules related to
infused carbon nanostructures and fullereneS206 that are intended to
protect workers and bystanders from the inhalation of these particles.
207
In contrast to the European Union's REACH regime,208 the EPA has little
ability to require manufacturers to test chemicals or to develop or update
safety data.20 9 The EPA maintains a Nanomaterial Research website that
provides extensive details about EPA research into nanomaterials and
related issues.210
Beyond the EPA, more than twenty federal departments or agencies
have expressed interest in nanomaterials.211 However, despite "attempts
to develop a coordinated approach to regulating nanomaterials," no
coordinated federal approach exists.212
V. BROADENING THE REGULATORY ENTERPRISE
A. Beyond Command-and-Control
The recent trend in scholarship is to view regulation broadly. From
this perspective the available tools include not merely hard law
instruments, such as statutes and regulations enforced by the
202. Id. at 258.
203. See, e.g., id at 253 ("[S]ince Congress passed the TSCA over 30 years ago, the
EPA issued regulations under the act to ban, limit, or restrict the production or use of
only five existing chemicals or chemical classes.").
204. See Tassinari et al., supra note 45, at 184 (describing EPA actions).
205. See id. at 187.
206. See John Miller et al., Derivatized Fullerenes: A New Class of Therapeutics
and Imaging Agents, 4 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & Bus. 423, 423 (2007) (explaining that
"[flullerenes, formally known as buckminsterfullerene, were discovered by Richard
Smalley in 1985. [They] are molecules usually comprised of 60 carbon atoms and have
the symmetry of soccer balls.").
207. Lawrence G. Cetrulo, Regulation-United States, in 3 Toxic TORTS LITIGATION
GUIDE § 36:9 (Supp. 2015) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 721.170(b)(3)(ii)).
208. See generally John C. Monica, Nanotechnology Regulation in Washington and
Brussels: TSCA vs. REACH, in NANOTECHNOLOGY LAW § 12:26 (Supp. 2015)
(comparing the United States and European Union regimes).
209. Widmer & Meili, supra note 10, at 253.
210. U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, RESEARCH ON NANOMATERIALS, https://www.epa.
gov/chemical-research/research-nanomaterials (last updated Oct. 18, 2016).
211. See Roger Hanshaw, Regulation of Nanomaterials: What Are They? How Are
They Regulated? Who Decides?, 29 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 44-45 (Spring 2015).
212. Id. at 45.
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government, but soft law instruments, such as industry2 13  and
governmental codes of conduct (such as the European Commission Code
of Conduct for Responsible Nanosciences and Nano Technologies
Research),214 aspirational guidelines and statements of best practices,215
voluntary reporting programs,216 nonbinding standards,217 Voluntary risk
management systems,2 18 and licensing, accreditation, or certification2 19
schemes.22 0
These options, many of which are located outside of the public
sector22 1 and are cross-disciplinary,22 2 offer opportunities for raising the
213. Weidl et al., supra note 80, at 466 ("In the majority of cases, codes of conduct
are not very restrictive or detailed."); id. at 466-67 (setting forth two nanotechnology-
related codes of conduct).
214. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION ON A CODE OF
CONDUCT FOR RESPONSIBLE NANOSCIENCES AND NANOTECHNOLOGIES RESEARCH &
COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS ON RESPONSIBLE NANOSCIENCES AND NANOTECHNOLOGIES
RESEARCH 13 (2009) (articulating principles of good governance, due respect for
precaution, and monitoring).
215. See Tassinari et al., supra note 45, at 195-97 (recommending that suppliers
should share material data; producers should engage with NGOs; manufacturers should
join industry consortia; and producers should work hand-in-hand with regulators); Anna
Gergely, Qasim Chaudhry & Diane Bowman, Regulatory Perspectives on
Nanotechnologies in Food and Food Contact Materials, in HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at
321, 329 (recommending that the food industry regulate the use of nanotechnologies
through bet practices and voluntary initiatives).
216. See Cetrulo, supra note 207, at § 36:9 (discussing the EPA's now-defunct
Nanoscale Materials Stewardship Program); Christoph Meili & Markus Widmer,
Voluntary Measures in Nanotechnology Risk Governance, in HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at
446, 448-49 (discussing the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(Defra) Voluntary Reporting Scheme).
217. See Weidl et al., supra note 80, at 467-72 (discussing the nanospecific standards
developed joint by Environmental Defense and Dupont, and by TUV SUD).
218. Meili & Widmer, supra note 216, at 451-54 (discussing programs).
219. See Weidl et al., supra note 80, at 463 ("'[C]ertification' refers to a procedure
that verifies systems, process, or products and a company's implementation to comply
with certain standards"); id. at 465 (noting that certification is a form of "voluntary self-
regulation."). To be effective, a "certification body must monitor public discussion as
well as new scientific findings and technological innovations and observe and track
regulatory trends and developments." Id. at 475.
220. Introduction, supra note 6, at 10 (listing options); Brownsword, supra note 48,
at 78 ("[W]e need interventions that offer the right support and incentives for beneficial
nanotechnology development."); Chaudhry et al., supra note 50, at 140 ("On the
regulatory side, it is prudent to promote voluntary schemes for industry to establish codes
of best practice in relation to production, emission, application and disposal of
[engineered nanomaterials], and support risk communication and consumer awareness
programmes.").
221. See Reut Snir, Trends in Global Nanotechnology Regulation: The Public-
Private Interplay, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 107, 111 (2014) ("The continual interplay
between public and private regulation is what shapes the current landscape and drives
regulatory innovation.").
222. Brownsword, supra note 48, at 63 ("[T]he coding that makes up the regulatory
environment will come from many sources, governmental and non-governmental, public
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awareness of key actors to potential health, safety, and environmental
issues and for building consensus about how to address those
problems.223  Since. 2006, such non-binding mechanisms have
increasingly been used in the United States, and to a lesser extent in the
European Union, to address issues related to nanomaterials.224
What is notable about the current discussion of nanotechnology
regulation is that it is taking place while nanotechnology and related
225
developments are at an early stage. In contrast, earlier regulatory
efforts-dealing, for example, with automobile safety-took place long
after industry practices had become well-established.226 Thus, it is now
possible to act to minimize nanotechnology risks before industry
practices become deeply engrained.227
To an important degree, the strategy of regulators should be to
engage "the practical reason of regulatees"2 28 because law is only "[t]he
most formal contribution to the regulatory environment."22 9  Viewed
broadly, the "regulatory environment" includes not only governmental
laws and regulations, but nongovernmental norms.230  This array of
options may aid "early detection of emerging risks and control of known
risks to ensure maximum safety in nanotechnology."23 1
1. Public Participation
Some groups see nanotechnology risks as raising issues of
21
transparency and of having a voice in regulation.232 To the extent that
the regulatory process allows opportunities for public participation in
deliberative processes, it addresses these concerns and enables regulatory
practices to be viewed as more legitimate.233 In Europe, there is a
"trend" of voter and consumer involvement in influencing risk-related
policy issues, such as those concerned with genetically modified food.234
and private, secular and non-secular, 'official' and 'unofficial', and it will be more or less
formal.").
223. Cf Weidl et al., supra note 80, at 477 (arguing that the point of certification
programs is to bridge the knowledge gap).
224. Meili & Widmer, supra note 216, at 447.
225. Maynard et al., supra note 39, at 579.
226. Id.
227. See Abbott et al., supra note 33, at 525 (noting the "unprecedented opportunity
to craft new regulatory or oversight approaches on a clean slate").
228. Brownsword, supra note 48, at 62.
229. Id. at 64.
230. Id. at 65.
231. Weidl et al., supra note 80, at 481-82.
232. Ludlow & Binks, supra note 29, at 148 (discussing transparency and public
participation).
233. Introduction, supra note 6, at 16.
234. Maynard et al., supra note 39, at 582.
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The scientific value of such public participation, which is often self-
interested,2 35 is open to question.2 36 In the United States, a majority of
the citizenry is convinced that the benefits of nanotechnology outweigh
the risks "although they know little about the technology."23 7 However,
the moral point is clear: it is ethically "questionable to deny citizens the
opportunity to be part of the process of technology regulation" if it
potentially impacts their lives in important ways.238
The Rio Declaration clearly states that "[e]nvironmental issues are
best handled with participation of all concerned citizens."23 9  Citizen
participation can inject into a highly technical regulatory process, where
there are few clear answers, both a measure of common sense and a
valuable indication of what measures are politically sustainable. Citizen
perceptions of risk reflect a range of factors other than the probability
and magnitude of harm.240 Public participation in regulatory processes
can counter the perception that "governments have a conflict of interest
as key nanotechnology proponents, major funders, risk assessors,
regulators and public 'educators .... 241
Viewed broadly, regulation offers a "much richer mix of
possibilities" than tightly constrained "command and control" models.242
Nevertheless, that mix includes some hard law options, such as applying
existing environmental laws governing clean air, pure water, and waste
disposal, to the problems associated with nanotechnology processes and
products.2 43
Of course, there are disadvantages to the use of soft law approaches
to resolving serious environmental issues. Certification programs that
235. Cf MARK SAGOFF, PRICE, PRINCIPLE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 2 (2004) ("[T]here
is an important difference between saying that something is good for me and saying
something is... good from the point of view of the world in general") (italics in
original).
236. See BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 126, at 96-98 (discussing the advantages and
dangers of public participation).
237. Ludlow & Binks, supra note 29, at 151.
238. Maynard et al., supra note 39, at 580.
239. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev. 1 (Vol. I), annex I,
principle 10 (Aug. 12, 1992).
240. BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 126, at 93
241. Georgia Miller & Gyorgy Scrinis, The Role of NGOs in Governing
Nanotechnologies: Challenging the "Benefits Versus Risks" Framing of Nanotech
Innovation, in HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 409, 429.
242. Introduction, supra note 6, at 19; see also Abbott et al., supra note 33, at 532;
Brownsword, supri note 48, at 61 ("[S]ome environments are regulated in a top-down
fashion (with regulators clearly distinguishable from regulatees), others are more bottom-
up (in the sense that they are self-regulatory).").
243. Breggin & Pendergrass, supra note 25, at 367-68 (Noting that nanotechnology
"regulators and stakeholders should be encouraged to focus on removing existing barriers
to the use of current laws.").
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are intended to enhance understanding of complex issues and promote
best practices are the type of voluntary measure that is likely to be cut by
244
a business facing financial pressures.
B. Internationalizing Regulation
Efforts to regulate the risks related to nanotechnology have been
concentrated at the national or regional (i.e., European Union) level.
However, the issues can easily be seen as international because those
risks and related practices routinely cross borders and pose issues
worldwide.24 5 "Internationally consistent standards would also protect
against a 'race to the bottom,"' in which countries sacrifice health,
safety, and environmental interests in an effort to attract nanotechnology
enterprises.246
To date, "international coordination of technology regulation has
been limited to a relatively small set of treaties and subject matter," and
"even in the product-specific sector of pharmaceutical regulation, there is
so far nothing to match the more internationally harmonized regulation
of trade or intellectual property."247 That record, and the difficulties of
achieving an international consensus on how to address even well
documented problems, such as climate change,248 make the enactment of
any convention imposing detailed regulatory requirements most
unlikely.249  This is particularly true because the multidisciplinary
scientific foundations of nanotechnology make it unlikely that a single
regime can be crafted to address the full range of risks. However, a soft
law approach to regulation might succeed even though a hard law
approach would fail.
Soft law-which generally refers to "non-binding international
agreements or norms"250-embraces the idea that "resolutions and
244. See Weidl et al., supra note 80, at 478.
245. Ludlow & Binks, supra note 29, at 151 (discussing how nanotechnology issues
can be framed as an international concern); Abbott et al., supra note 33, at 528
("[C]ommerce generally, and nanotechnology development specifically, are increasingly
global in nature, and so must be addressed at a global level.").
246. Abbott et al., supra note 33, at 528.
247. Ludlow & Binks, supra note 29, at 152-53.
248. See The 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Significance and
Implications for the Future, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,267, 10,268-69
(2016) (discussing the difficult, more than twenty-year-long process that finally led to a
major agreement on climate change").
249. Ludlow & Binks, supra note 29, at 153 ("[W]hile there are serious problems
with national public health laws, it will be difficult to get international consensus on such
international regulation of nanotechnology."); Abbott et al., supra note 33, at 526 (noting
that "very little has occurred").
250. Jeffrey M. Pollock & Jonathan S. Jemison, The Emerging of International
Environmental Law, N.J. LAW. 25, 28 (1999).
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recommendations of international organizations can 'gradually acquire
some legal value."' 251 The basic role of soft law is to create expectations
which, once widely subscribed to, can be translated into binding legal
obligations, i.e., hard law.
Ideally, soft lawmaking is a fluid process because binding
obligations and enforcement mechanisms are not in issue. This fluidity
may enable international parties to reach a consensus more quickly, and
thereby respond more promptly to scientific and technological changes.
Soft law could be used to firmly place nanotechnology risks on the
international agenda, create a basis for reporting and sharing relevant
252information, and lay the groundwork for a framework treaty to be
enacted.253 That framework treaty might be patterned on the Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,254 a treaty which
imposed no binding substantive obligations, but set the stage for
adopting ozone reduction mandates under the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.255 Soft law can be particularly
useful in situations where there are scientific uncertainties, but common
interests, for it allows binding obligations to emerge as the facts become
clearer.256
Soft law instruments, such as United Nations resolutions and
recommendations, could be coupled with increased efforts to build
international governance capacity through institutions such as the United
Nations Environment Programme and the World Health Organization,257
and to promote regulatory convergence of the disparate legal
frameworks, institutions, and practices found throughout the world. 2 58
The World Bank sometimes adopts soft law principles and might place
environmental requirements derived from nanotechnology soft law into
their lending policies and conditions, and thereby give international
actors additional reason to comply with those standards.259
251. Id.
252. Cf Falkner et al., supra note 20, at 509 ("Ongoing international efforts to create
scientific building blocks for risk assessment of nanomaterials needs to be stepped up.").
253. See Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 188 (2010) (explaining that soft law can serve as a coordinating
device).
254. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 1531
U.N.T.S. 324.
255. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 1.
256. See Timothy Meyer, Shifting Sands: Power, Uncertainty and the Form of
International Legal Cooperation, 27 EUR. J. INT'LL. 161, 162 (2016).
257. Cf Falkner et al., supra note 20, at 510.
258. See id. at 514 (discussing the need to promote international regulatory
convergence).
259. See Pollock & Jemison, supra note 250, at 28 (discussing the World Bank); but
see Ida Koivisto, The IMF and the "Transparency Turn, " 25 MINN. J. INT'L L. 381, 403
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An argument in favor of using soft law to address the health, safety,
and environmental issues related to nanotechnology stands on firm
ground. There is a well-established principle of international
environmental law, "affirmed in virtually all international environmental
agreements of bilateral and regional application,"2 6 0 as well as in global
instruments,2 6' that there is a duty to cooperate in matters concerning the
protection of the environment.
VI. CONCLUSION
General regulatory regimes, such as those dealing with chemical
and toxic substances in the European Union and the United States, may
prove to be inadequate to deal with the scientifically complex challenges
of nanotechnology. At the same time, nanospecific regulations are likely
to be difficult to enact,262 and even if established at the national level
may produce an inconsistent patchwork of obligations263 incapable of
264grappling effectively with what is in fact an international problem.
Minimizing the health, safety, and environmental risks related to
nanotechnology requires raising the visibility of the issue, collecting
reliable data, establishing prudent practices, building an international
consensus, and eventually enacting and enforcing binding obligations
that reflect a prudent balance between economic progress and hazard
precautions in each of the many areas of life that will be affected by
emerging nanotechnologies. These goals can best be advanced by
viewing risk regulation broadly and using soft law instruments to lay the
groundwork for the adoption of binding nanospecific provisions once
scientific developments permit a clear assessment of relevant risk data
and the advantages and costs of regulation.
(2016) ("Some developing countries have expressed concern over these covertly and
asymmetrically imposed soft law obligations.").
260. PHILIPPE SANDS, JACQUELINE PEEL, ADRIANA FABRA & RUTH MACKENZIE,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 204 (3d ed. 2012).
261. See Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, supra note 254,
at art. 2(2); Convention on Biological Diversity art. 5, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818
(entered into force Dec. 29, 1993).
262. See Cetrulo, supra note 173, at § 36:10 ("[G]overnments worldwide have done
very little to slow the expansion of nanotechnology in the consumer market.").
263. Cf Bergkamp, supra note 74, at 94 ("[EU] Member States have enacted
nanotech-specific requirements, such as mandatory reporting with national nanotech
registries . . . [which] prevents an effective coordination between EU and national
initiatives and thereby carries a risk of fragmenting the internal market.").
264. Cf Taylor L. Kraus, Caring About Personal Care Products: Regulation in the
United States, the European Union, and China in the Age of Global Consumption, 33
WIS. INT'L L.J. 167, 169 (2015) ("[A]bsent effective, consistent, and overlapping
legislation between foreign nations, consumers in the global market place are
inadequately protected.").
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